*487 MEMORANDUM **

Mark Chin appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court determined was time-barred under the An-titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). We affirm.

For the first time on appeal, Chin asserts that the state corrections department’s denial of his administrative appeal, which formed the basis of his habeas petition, was a “judgment” subject to direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court, § 2244(d)(1)(A), rather than “the factual predicate of [his] claim,” § 2244(d)(1)(D). He argues that, because his petition is governed by § 2244(d)(1)(A), he was entitled to take advantage of that sub-section’s provision that AEDPA’s one-year limitation period does not begin to run until “the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review.” Consequently, Chin asserts, the limitation period only began to run 90 days after his administrative appeal was denied — once the deadline to petition for a writ of certiorari had passed.

Chin had conceded before the district court that the limitations period began to run when the denial of his administrative appeal was issued, and he was right. “[W]hen a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision affecting the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’ AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations runs from when the ‘factual predicate’ of the habeas claims ‘could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.’ As a general rule, the state agency’s denial of an administrative appeal is the ‘factual predicate’ for such habeas claims.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(D)).

AFFIRMED.