MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner Steven Jackson petitions for review of the final order of the Benefits Review Board, affirming the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs’ District Director’s order reducing the hours and fees in an attorney’s fee petition and granting Jackson’s attorneys, Eric Dupree and Paul Myers, an attorney fee award of $16,736.50. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). For the following reasons, we deny the petition for review.

We review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Tahara v. Matson Terminals, Inc., 511 F.3d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2007). “Any elements of legal analysis that figure into the fee determination are subject to de novo review, and we review underlying factual determinations for clear error.” Id. Jackson was successful on a *617 federal workers’ compensation claim against Respondent True Blue, Inc., 2 and thus he is entitled to a “reasonable attorney’s fee” pursuant to § 28 of the Long-shore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 38 U.S.C. § 928. “Use of the ‘lodestar method’ to calculate attorney’s fees under a federal fee-shifting statute is proper.” Tahara, 511 F.3d at 955 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The lodestar method requires the court to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. ... In calculating the number of hours reasonably expended, a district court is to exclude hours that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).

The attorneys’ fees in dispute relate to time spent by Dupree and Myers solely in the fee proceeding. The District Director disallowed 60.6 of the 80.4 hours spent on two reply briefs because these hours were “excessive/unnecessary billing” and were “duplicative in nature or excessive for the scope of this case.”

“The district court need only provide a ‘concise but clear explanation of its reasons’ for reducing the numbers of hours included in the fee award.” Tahara, 511 F.3d at 956 (quoting Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)). We conclude that the District Director’s explanation fully complied with this requirement.

Additionally, we conclude both that the District Director did not abuse his discretion in reducing the hours claimed and that the amount of the fee award was sufficient. “[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in -view of the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation-” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The claimed hours occurred after Jackson’s success on the merits, and without the District Director’s reduction, the claimed hours would have resulted in an attorneys’ fee award disproportionate to Jackson’s award.

Finally, we conclude that the Board applied the correct standard in affirming the District Director’s reduction of the hours.

PETITION DENIED.