MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Larry Histon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We re *635 view de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Histon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent in their treatment of his carpal tunnel syndrome. See id. at 1057-58 (neither negligence nor difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment amounts to deliberate indifference); see also Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012) (prisoner must show that defendant chose a medically unacceptable course of treatment “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiffs health” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Histon’s motion for leave to amend his complaint and to perfect service to unserved defendants because the motion was moot upon the court’s grant of summary judgment. See Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Histon’s motion for appointment of counsel because Histon did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review and explaining “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

We decline to consider those documents submitted by Histon that were not presented to the district court. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(a); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1989).

AFFIRMED.