Irvine Unified School District v. California Department of Education

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Irvine Unified School District v. California Department of Education, 506 F. App'x 548 (9th Cir. 2013)

Irvine Unified School District v. California Department of Education

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

The California Department of Education appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Irvine Unified School District (IUSD), K.G., and the Orange County Department of Education. K.G. was a ward of the state of California who was placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility due to his exceptional emotional needs. The district court held that the California Department of Education was responsible for providing a free and public education (F.A.P.E.) to K.G., reasoning that K.G. was “parentless” for purposes of the California school residency statute, Cal. Educ.Code § 48200. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In light of our recent decision in Orange County Department of Education v. California Department of Education, 668 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2011), which had not been decided at the time summary judgment was granted, we must reverse.

In Orange County, we held that the 2007 version of Cal. Educ.Code § 56028 supplied the definition of “parent” for Cal. Educ.Code § 48200. 1 Orange County, 668 F.3d at 1058. The definition of “parent” in § 56028 includes “[a] guardian ... authorized to make educational decisions for [a] child.” Cal. Educ.Code § 56028(a)(3) (2007). In Orange County, we stated that the term “guardian” is commonly understood as one who has legal authority to care for another’s person because of the other’s disability, and that a guardian may be appointed for a specific purpose. Orange County, 668 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 774 (9th ed. *550 2009)). There, we also concluded that the definition of a “guardian” includes someone who was “appointed by the juvenile court to have legal authority for making educational decisions on [the student’s] behalf.” Id. at 1061. We are bound by this precedent. See United States v. Easterday, 564 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the Superior Court of the County of Orange appointed a “responsible adult” to make educational decisions on KG.’s behalf pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 316, 417. That “responsible adult” is a “parent” within the meaning of § 56028(3) because a responsible adult is defined there as a “guardian ... authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the child.” Orange County, 668 F.3d at 1061.

Because K.G.’s responsible adult resided within the IUSD, IUSD was KG.’s district of residence prior to his eighteenth birthday, and, therefore, IUSD was required to provide the F.A.P.E. to K.G. IUSD remained responsible for K.G.’s education once he turned eighteen because it was “the last district of residence in effect pri- or to the pupil’s attaining the age of majority.” Cal. Educ.Code § 56041. IUSD was therefore KG.’s district of residence under § 48200 at all times relevant to this appeal. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this disposition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. "California Education Code section 48200 establishes the general rule under California law that the school district responsible for the education of a child between the ages of six and 18 [sic ] is the district in which the child’s 'parent or legal guardian’ resides.” Orange County, 668 F.3d at 1056.

Reference

Full Case Name
IRVINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, and K.G., an Adult Student; Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant
Cited By
2 cases
Status
Unpublished