MEMORANDUM ***

Rachelle Lynette Carlock appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 120-month sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for pos *662 session of a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(a)(B)(ii); and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Carlock contends that in granting a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3558(e), the district court should have considered factors unrelated to her substantial assistance, including the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. She argues that the district court’s interpretation of section 3553(e) is contrary to the language of the statute and Supreme Court precedent. She further contends that the district court’s interpretation creates a perverse incentive for defendants. Carlock’s contentions are foreclosed. See United States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2703, 183 L.Ed.2d 60 (2012); United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009).

Carlock also contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of section 3553(a)’s parsimony principle. Because the district court was not allowed to further reduce Carlock’s sentence on the basis of section 3553(a)’s factors, this contention fails. See Jackson, 577 F.3d at 1036.

AFFIRMED.