MEMORANDUM ***

Chan-Tay Cross (“Cross”) appeals from the district court’s order denying her mo *518 tion to set aside judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We review such an order for an abuse of discretion. Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” Id. Applying this standard, we affirm.

1. We have adopted a four-factor equitable analysis “to determine whether neglect is ‘excusable’ under Rule 60(b)(1).” Bateman v. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying this equitable analysis and determining that the neglect of Cross’s counsel was not excusable. The reasons given by Cross’s counsel were no different than circumstances faced by many lawyers who meet applicable deadlines or timely seek continuances, and, in any event, the unfortunate events do not account for the nearly one-year delay in filing the Rule 60(b) motion.

2. Cross also argued for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which authorizes the court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” To merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute [his case].” Comm’y Dental Svcs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court correctly applied this standard and held that Cross had not made the required showing.

AFFIRMED.