MEMORANDUM ***

The district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the lodestar amount *387 for the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). It properly determined reasonable hourly rates and a reasonable number of hours and “exclude[d] hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ ” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by reducing the award of attorney’s fees because of the “limited success” and lack of “meaningful public benefit.” Id. at 1103. The “amount [was] reasonable and the court fully explain[ed] its reasoning,” so there was no abuse of discretion. Id. at 1102.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Plaintiffs counsel. See De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). The record supports the court’s finding that Plaintiffs counsel acted intentionally in violating court orders and rules, which justified the court’s use of its inherent authority to award sanctions. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiffs opening brief failed to adequately argue the issues of costs and the motion for judgment as a matter of law, so we need not and do not reach those issues. Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002).

AFFIRMED.