Earl Hobbs v. State of California
Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Earl Hobbs, an inactive attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from an attempt to evict him and the resulting unlawful detainer action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and a dismissal based on res judicata, Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hobbs’s § 1983 and declaratory relief claims on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata because those claims were based on the same primary right asserted in a prior state court action. See Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment federal courts look to state law.... California’s res judicata doctrine is based on a primary rights theory.” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Hobbs’s claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Hobbs failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity and other required elements. See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing elements of a RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Earl HOBBS, an Individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of CALIFORNIA; Belmont Shores Investors, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, Defendants-Appellees
- Status
- Unpublished