MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Mark L. Edwards appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and argues that the state court’s decision affirming his conviction was “contrary to” federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We affirm.

Edwards first asserts that the phrase “great bodily injury” as used in his sentence enhancement is unconstitutionally vague. Edwards’s contention is without merit. As the California Court of Appeals properly found, the phrase “great bodily injury” has a well-settled, common-law meaning and is therefore not void for vagueness. See Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 1993) (‘When a term has a well-settled common law meaning, it will not violate due process ‘notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ.’ ” (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926))); see also Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 521 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the common usage of the phrase “serious bodily injury” afforded sufficient clarity to comport with due process).

Edwards next argues that the three-year sentencing enhancements he received *716 for personally inflicting serious bodily injury constituted double jeopardy. We disagree. The California appellate court properly concluded that sentencing enhancements are not “multiple punishments” within the meaning of the double jeopardy prohibition. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995).

AFFIRMED.