MEMORANDUM ***

Miguel Andres Mendez appeals his sentence following a plea of guilty to a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We have juris *570 diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

The district court did not plainly err in imposing a sixteen-level enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2L1.2. See United States v. Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the court reviews for plain error when a defendant of violating Wisconsin Statute § 940.225(3)), which prohibits either sexual intercourse without consent or sexual contact without consent. Applying the modified categorical approach, Mendez’s conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” because it constitutes a “forcible sex offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2281-82, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) (permitting application of the modified categorical approach only if a defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute); Suazo Perez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1222, 1227 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the defendant’s entry of an Alford plea does not preclude the application of the modified categorical approach). The judicially noticeable documents that the government submitted to the district court demonstrate that Mendez was convicted of third-degree sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with the victim without the victim’s consent. See Gallegos-Galindo, 704 F.3d at 1274-75 (holding that sexual intercourse without the victim’s consent constitutes a “forcible sex offense”).

AFFIRMED.