MEMORANDUM **

In this diversity suit, defendants-appellants Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, Stephen A. *664 Wynn, and Barbara Conway (collectively, “Wynn”) appeal the denial of a special motion filed under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal.CivProc.Code § 425.16, to strike the complaint filed by plaintiff-ap-pellee Joseph R. Francis. We affirm.

1. Applicability of California or Nevada anti-SLAPP law.

Francis argues that the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute, not California’s, applies, and that this court therefore lacks jurisdiction. Because California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 425.16(b), (i), 904.1, provides a right to appeal the denial of a special motion to dismiss, we have treated such denials as final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2013). Nevada’s statute, however, does not provide a right of appeal from the denial of a special motion to dismiss. Nev. Rev.Stat. §§ 41.660(l)(a), 41.650.

“When a federal court sits in diversity, it must look to the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine the controlling substantive law.” Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 2002). California applies the “governmental interest analysis in resolving choice-of-law issues.” Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal.4th 95, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 730, 137 P.3d 914, 922 (2006). Under this approach the court “evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.” Id. at 922 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies here. California is both the domicile and selected forum of the putatively injured party, Francis. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 101 Cal.Rptr. 314, 330 (1972). Further, applying Nevada’s law would improperly limit California’s expansive defendant-friendly policy. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal.3d 313, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719, 724 (1976). This court has jurisdiction.

2. Applicability of California or Nevada substantive law to Francis’ claims.

Applying the California choice-of-law analysis, we agree with the district court that a California court would apply Nevada’s substantive law 1 to determine whether Francis has put forth sufficient evidence to survive the anti-SLAPP statute’s “summary-judgment-like procedure,” Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 54 Cal. Rptr.3d 775, 151 P.3d 1185, 1205 (2007), on his claims against Wynn for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(1).

The “state with the ‘predominant’ interest” in applying its law “normally is the state in which [the underlying] conduct occurs.” Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 93 Cal.App.3d 384, 155 Cal.Rptr. 770, 777 (1979). Here, as the district court noted, *665 all of “the alleged criminal conduct took place in Nevada and the allegedly false criminal complaint was made by Nevada citizens in Nevada to a Nevada prosecutor.” Thus, Nevada substantive law applies to Francis’ claims.

3. Probability of prevailing— malicious prosecution.

Under Nevada law, malicious prosecution requires: “(1) want of probable cause to initiate the prior criminal proceeding; (2)malice; (8) termination of the prior criminal proceedings; and (4) damage.” Jordan v. Bailey, 113 Nev. 1038, 944 P.2d 828, 834 (1997). Wynn does not dispute that the prior criminal proceedings terminated in Francis’ favor or that Francis can establish damages.

There is substantial evidence to support Francis’ position that there was no probable cause to initiate charges against Francis in connection with a marker he issued to the Wynn casino. A Nevada court, in dismissing criminal charges against Francis, explicitly held that “the State did not present ‘slight’ or ‘marginal’ evidence demonstrating Mr. Francis intended to take the marker out from the Wynn and not repay his debt.” Nevada v. Francis, No. C-ll-270780-1 (Nev. Dist. Ct. filed Sept. 14, 2011). And, Francis has put forth some evidence of actual malice— a reasonable jury could infer malice from Wynn’s filing a complaint stating that the casino had submitted Francis’ marker within “30 days” as was its “normal course of business,” when in fact it submitted the marker some sixteen months after execution. See Pope v. Motel 6, 121 Nev. 307, 114 P.3d 277, 284 (2005) (holding that actual malice may be “proven by demonstrating that a statement is published ... with reckless disregard for its veracity”). The district court correctly determined that Francis has made a sufficient showing on the malicious prosecution claim to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion.

4. Probability of prevailing— other claims.

Francis’ remaining claims can only succeed if Wynn’s submission of the complaint to the Las Vegas police was not privileged. Under Nevada law, Wynn’s action is privileged unless Francis can “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant abused the privilege by publishing the defamatory communication with actual malice.” Pope, 114 P.3d at 283-84. Francis has come forward with evidence of actual malice and thus has “submit[ted] specific factual evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue.” John v. Douglas, 125 Nev. 746, 219 P.3d 1276, .1281 (2009).

AFFIRMED.