MEMORANDUM **

Mary Anne Salmon appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of Carolyn Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security.

Salmon argues that our remand directive in Salmon v. Astrue, 309 F. App’x. 113, 116 (9th Cir. 2009), required the administrative law judge (ALJ) to reevaluate her alleged physical impairment. But as the ALJ and the district court concluded, the scope of the remand was limited to consideration of Salmon’s alleged mental impairment: “We reverse and remand for reconsideration of the determination of Salmon’s mental capacity with instructions to accept Salmon’s pain testimony as true.” Id. (emphasis added). True, we instructed the ALJ to “accept Salmon’s pain testimony,” but we emphasized that Salmon’s pain testimony “may have a bearing on her depression and overall mental problems and should be-considered in that light by the ALJ.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ did not err by refusing to reexamine Salmon’s claim of physical disability.

With regard to Salmon’s alleged mental impairment, she contends that the ALJ’s decision denying her claim was not supported by substantial evidence and that she was entitled to benefits as a matter of law. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005). As documented by the district court, the ALJ provided “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting the opinion of Dr. David Silver-man, relying instead on the mutually supportive opinions of Drs. Laurie Weiss and Danilo Lucila. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Such analysis satisfies our “highly deferential standard of review.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s decision is “supported by substantial evidence and [is] a correct application of the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.