MEMORANDUM *

A majority of the panel agrees that the grant of summary judgment was improper, but the judges disagree as to why. One judge believes that Davis has created a triable issue of fact as to whether the school district’s policy of allowing out-of-district seniors to finish their studies created a protected property interest, particularly because the school knowingly acquiesced in Davis’s continued enrollment without an out-of-district permit. See Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont., 687 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011); Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 377 (9th Cir. 1983).

The other judge in the majority would hold that Davis has created a triable issue of fact as to whether Davis’s disenrollment implicated a liberty interest. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Although the school district argues that “disenrollment” differs from expulsion, the form the school gave Davis (1) was titled “Expulsion Procedures: Due Process Rights;” (2) listed Davis’s “offense” as “Possessed, sold, or otherwise furnished any firearm, knife, explosive, or other dangerous object;” and (3) stated that Davis was entitled to several “Due Process Rights,” including a hearing. The second judge therefore believes that Davis has sufficiently shown that the disenrollment affected his liberty interest in his reputation to survive summary judgment.

REVERSED.