MEMORANDUM ***

Kingsley Osemwengie appeals from the district court’s judgment and its 210-month sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Osemwengie contends that the district court erred by (i) accepting the Presen-tence Investigation Report’s base offense level of 34; (ii) counting two prior convictions as separate convictions in calculating his Criminal History Category; and (iii) failing to adequately explain the sentence, which Osemwengie also claims was unreasonable. We review each of these arguments for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none.

First, both the parties and the PSR agreed that Osemwengie’s base offense level was 34, and thus the district court did not err, much less plainly err, when it adopted that level. Second, the PSR was correct to conclude that Osemwengie’s second prior conviction counted as an “intervening arrest” for purposes of Section 4A1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and thus the district court did not err, much less plainly err, when it adopted that finding. Finally, the record as a whole demonstrates that the district court adequately considered Osemwengie’s mitigating arguments and the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sufficiently explained the sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Nor was the district court’s sentence, which reflected a downward variance based on Section 3553(a) and was at the bottom of the Guidelines range, an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, including Osemwengie’s criminal history. See id.

AFFIRMED.