MEMORANDUM **

Joseph Gendreau appeals summary judgment against his section 1983 and state law claims naming the City of Mercer Island and Mercer Island Police Officer Robb Kramp. Central to each claim is the allegation that Officer Kramp lacked probable cause to arrest Gendreau. The district court found probable cause and, in the alternative, that Officer Kramp was entitled to qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We agree and affirm.

Gendreau got into an altercation with a realtor who had parked in his driveway while he was away. Following the altercation, the realtor, Ms. Forschler, gave a sworn statement to Officer Kramp. In it, she explained that she and her client had parked in Gendreau’s driveway to view a nearby listed home. When she returned to her car, she saw Gendreau exit his vehicle, which he had parked behind hers, blocking her exit. Gendreau walked toward her briskly, shouting and cursing.1 She said that Gendreau threatened to get her fired. He then confronted her and swiped papers from her hands. Forschler *727was in “utter shock” and feared for her safety, so much so that she lost control of her bladder.2

Officer Kramp also spoke to Gendreau before making the arrest. Officer Kramp asked Gendreau about documents that Forschler claimed Gendreau had taken from her car before the altercation. Gen-dreau admitted he had the documents but claimed he found them on his driveway. Yet he also admitted to entering For-schler’s vehicle in her absence to honk her horn. Gendreau declined to prepare a sworn statement, claiming he was too tired.

We conclude that Forschler’s sworn statement, corroborated in part by Gendreau’s statement, provided “reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that” Gendreau had assaulted Forschler. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013).3 Mercer Island Municipal Code § 9.06.010(A)(1) defines assault as “intentionally plac[ing] or attempt[ing] to place another person in fear or apprehension of bodily harm by any act, word or threat.” Officer Kramp had evidence that Gendreau trapped the victim in his driveway when he blocked Forschler’s vehicle, walked toward her briskly — shouting and cursing — and swiped papers from her hands. These are actions reasonably indicative of Gendreau intending “to place [Forschler] in fear or apprehension of bodily harm.” Mercer Is. Muni.Code § 9.06.010(A)(1). Indeed, it appears that Gendreau succeeded; Forschler swore to Officer Kramp that Gendreau’s actions caused her to wet herself.

Gendreau says Officer Kramp should have investigated further before arresting him. He directs us to two cases — United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010) and Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009) — for the proposition that officers may not, in establishing probable cause, rely solely on the claim of a citizen witness. Even accepting that these cases hold what Gendreau says, Officer Kramp did not rely solely on For-schler’s sworn statement. In contrast to the cases Gendreau cites, here Officer Kramp discussed the altercation with Gen-dreau before making the arrest. Gen-dreau’s admissions corroborated enough of Forschler’s statement to establish probable cause to arrest him.4

Finally, we agree with the district court’s alternative holding that Officer *728Kramp is entitled to qualified immunity. Gendreau makes only two arguments to the contrary. He says that Forschler’s statements to Officer Kramp did not establish probable cause and that “[t]here was no corroboration from the other witnesses.” We have already explained that the evidence known to the investigating officer established probable cause. And Officer Kramp did corroborate part of Forschler’s statement through Gendreau himself. Even if Officer Kramp made a mistake in assessing the significance of the facts before him and did not have probable cause based on the information he had gathered, though we believe he was correct, “a reasonable officer in [his] position would not have clearly known that his conduct was unlawful under these circumstances.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

concurring:

I concur as to qualified immunity only. I would not reach the question whether there was in fact probable cause to believe an assault was committed. I tend to think there was not. But the question is close enough that I cannot say that a reasonable police officer could not have concluded otherwise. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).