MEMORANDUM ***

1.The district court did not plainly err by delaying Mauricio Castillo-Cansino’s revocation sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 “ ‘primarily’ governs ... post-revocation sentencing[s].” United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Leonard, 483 F.3d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2007)). Rule 32.1(b)(2) requires “the court [to] hold the revocation hearing within a reasonable time.” Here, any violation of Rule 32.1’s timeliness requirement was not “clear” or “obvious” under current law. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Given our holding in Whitlock, even if United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1994), suggests application of Rule 32, application of Rule 32.1’s reasonableness standard would not constitute plain error.

2. The district court did not plainly err by failing to provide the government an opportunity to speak at the revocation sentencing. Because Castillo-Cansino cites no authority requiring that the district court provide the government an opportunity to speak, any error could not be “clear under current law,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Castillo-Cansino cites Carper, but Carper addresses a defendant’s right to allocute, not the government’s right to speak. See 24 F.3d at 1158.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence that fell within the Guideline range. The district court’s decision was not substantively unreasonable, because, in addition to the imposition of punishment for the crime underlying the revocation, “a court may properly sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

*691 The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.