MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiffs, homeowners whose home loans have fallen into default, appeal the district court’s order dismissing their Proposed First Amended Complaint (“PFAC”) without leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.

Plaintiffs challenge the order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) transferring this case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (“MDL Court”) and the MDL Court’s order interpreting the JPML’s order. We lack jurisdiction to review the JPML’s order because Plaintiffs have not sought a writ of mandamus. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e); Robinson v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.), No. 11-17615, 754 F.3d 772, 780, 2014 WL 2611314, at *5 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs waived their challenge to the MDL Court’s order by not “specifically and distinctly” arguing it in their opening brief. Kim v. Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998).

On remand from the MDL Court, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment. Under Nevada law, unjust enrichment is not available when the parties had an express, written contract. Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated Nov. 12, 1975, 113 Nev. 747, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (1997).

Even if unjust enrichment is available when a contract is procured by fraud, Plaintiffs did not plead fraud with particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The PFAC is “shot through with general allegations that the ‘defendants’ engaged in fraudulent conduct.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007). It does not “identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme.” Id. (altera *698 tions and internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does it identify the specific content of any individual misrepresentation, where or when it was made, or which defendant made it to which plaintiff. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).

Because Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment fails, the district court also properly dismissed their requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Although a district court should grant leave to amend liberally, the court may deny leave if amendment would be futile. Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the PFAC did not state a claim for relief, the district court’s decision that the amendment would be futile was not an abuse of discretion. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2011).

AFFIRMED.