MEMORANDUM **

We review a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely de novo, Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010), and its factual findings for clear error, Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012).

Notwithstanding the district court’s incorrect application of Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1983), in dismissing Azam’s first federal habeas petition, see Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2013), Azam’s second federal habeas petition cannot relate back to his first federal habeas petition. 1 See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] ha-beas petition filed after the district court dismisses a previous petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies cannot relate back to the original habeas petition.”). Therefore, his second federal habeas petition was untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Nevertheless, Azam is entitled to equitable tolling. See Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2014). In dismissing Azam’s first federal habeas petition, the district court failed to consider Azam’s re *683 quest for a stay and did not give Azam “the option to amend the mixed petition to remove the unexhausted claims.” Id. Therefore, its dismissal of Azam’s second habeas petition as untimely was improper. Id. In such circumstances, “the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the AED-PA statute of limitations from the date the mixed petition was dismissed until the date a new federal habeas petition is filed, assuming ordinary diligence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The government claims Azam waived both the relation back and equitable tolling arguments. However, in our discretion we find that Azam, as a pro se petitioner, sufficiently alleged these claims in his petitions. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2011). 2

REVERSED and REMANDED.