MEMORANDUM ***

Alfonso Torres-Sanehez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision finding Torres-San-ehez removable based on his California conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. 1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), “except as provided in subparagraph (D), no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order -of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2).” The offenses covered by § 1182(a)(2) include crimes involving moral turpitude. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). “This court has jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction exists.” Morales v. Gonzales, 4 78 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not have jurisdiction, therefore we must dismiss the petition.

California Penal Code § 288(a) criminalizes lewd or lascivious acts upon or with the body of a child who is under the age of 14 years, “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” Torres-Sanehez conceded before the BIA, and before this court, that if he had been convicted of violating § 288(a), then he would be subject to deportation because violation of § 288(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Therefore, the only question before us is whether there is reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence that Torres-Sanchez was convicted of violating § 288(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).

The IJ granted Torres-Sanehez two continuances to await the result of his motion to vacate his conviction in state court. ’On August 27, 2009, Torres-Sanchez’s attorney informed the IJ that the motion to vacate the state conviction was *686 denied. At that same hearing the IJ acknowledged that the state conviction was for violation of § 288(a). The record contains a felony complaint charging Torres-Sanchez with violating § 288(a) and several minute orders concerning that charge. These are appropriate documents to rely on as proof of a criminal conviction in these circumstances, and these documents establish that Torres-Sanchez was convicted of violating § 288(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B).

This court has jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But such claims “must present a colorable claim,” meaning “the claim must have some possible validity.” See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). None of the arguments raised by Torres-Sanchez in his petition are colorable. 2 Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s removal order. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D).

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.