MEMORANDUM ***

De Edward Lester appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Lester contends that he should be granted habeas relief because illicitly-attained incriminating statements were admitted at trial and caused actual prejudice. Lester relies on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), which held that “the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent,” Id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, and that such “incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges.” Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477.

Without deciding whether Moulton was violated, we conclude that Lester has *739 failed to show that the introduction of the statements had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 687, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The tainted evidence was merely “in effect, cumulative” of other “weighty” evidence that indubitably influenced the jury. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639, 113 S.Ct. 1710; see also Moses, 555 F.3d at 755 (holding that, in light of strong evidence of guilt, tainted evidence was harmless under Brecht).

AFFIRMED.