MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Michael O. De-Vaughn appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from his removal to California to stand trial on criminal charges. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 680 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed DeVaughn’s claim that defendants violated his constitutional rights in the processing and handling of his prison grievances because prisoners do not have a “constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).

To the extent that DeVaughn brought claims challenging the fact and duration of his confinement, those claims were properly dismissed. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DeVaughn’s motion to alter or amend judgment because De-Vaughn failed to establish clear error or other grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)).

We reject as without merit DeVaughn’s contention that he is entitled as a matter of law to injunctive relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3626.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.