MEMORANDUM **

Washington state prisoner James O’Neil Wiggin appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994), and may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper on Wig-gin’s claims against all defendants because, even assuming that Wiggin exhausted his administrative remedies, Wiggin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were involved in any search of his cell, and whether their four-day delay in providing him legal copies and an alleged disciplinary warning would have chilled or silenced a person of ordinary firmness from exercising their First Amendment rights. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context include retaliatory motive, adverse action, and chilling of First Amendment rights); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (causation requirement under § 1983).

We do not consider the district court’s postjudgment order denying Wiggin’s motion for reconsideration because Wiggin did not file a new or amended notice of *377 appeal from that order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).

AFFIRMED.