MEMORANDUM ***

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that country conditions have fundamentally changed in India. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(A), 1208.16(b)(l)(i)(A); Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 830-33 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing fundamentally changed conditions in India). The BIA examined numerous country conditions reports including documents from the State Department, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United Kingdom Home Office Border Agency, and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. These documents provide substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s finding that the treatment of Sikhs has changed “dramatically.” Contrary to Amarjit Singh’s contentions, the BIA conducted the required individualized analysis. See Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Singh, 753 F.3d at 834. The BIA found that Singh was not a high-level militant and that the fundamentally changed country conditions have rendered safe those in his situation.

Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Singh could reasonably relocate within India. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(l)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(l)(i)(B). The BIA conducted a proper, individualized analysis, focusing on Singh’s situation and his past persecution at the hands of local police in Haryana. The BIA found that the local police would have believed Singh was at most a low-level Sikh militant; that Sikhs, including low-level ex-militants, are able to move safely throughout the country; and that the police in Singh’s home state are unlikely to travel throughout the country looking for him if he returns. The BIA also found that tenant-registration drives are unlikely to affect Singh’s safety in India. Nothing in the record “compels” us to find otherwise. See Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014).

In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the government rebutted the presumption that Singh has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. See Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Singh was not deprived of the opportunity to testify in violation of his due process rights. He was given ample opportunity to submit documents and could *295 have requested to testify. His tactical choice not to testify when he thought the Immigration Judge was going to award asylum did not render the proceedings “fundamentally unfair.” Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011).

3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh failed to demonstrate that the evidence he hoped to submit was either new or previously unavailable. Cf. Oyeniran v. Holder, 672 F.3d 800, 808 (9th Cir. 2012). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding even the newer pieces of evidence cumulative or non-material.

PETITION DENIED.