MEMORANDUM ***

Williams’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is procedurally defaulted. Williams’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue was raised for the first time when Williams sought to orally amend his peti *692 tion on the day of his state habeas hearing, almost two and a half years after the filing of his state petition. 1 The state court’s decision to reject that amendment as untimely was based on an independent and adequate state ground. Williams has not shown that the state law at issue — Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.610 — is “inadequate,” see Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002), nor has he shown cause or prejudice for his procedural default, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 2 Id.

Even if we were to construe Williams’s state petition liberally and conclude that he exhausted the trial counsel IAC claim, he would not prevail on the merits. The pretrial publicity in the record is not of such a prejudicial character that it was objectively unreasonable for his counsel to have failed to move for a change of venue. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378, 381-84, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

AFFIRMED.