*544 MEMORANDUM *

Appellant Michael Holland (Holland) appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against the County of Los Angeles (County), Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and individual DCFS social workers (collectively, Defendants). Holland’s complaint alleges that, in retaliation for authoring a book and threatening to sue DCFS, Defendants falsely and maliciously accused Holland of child abuse, caused his loss of employment, and listed him on the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI), thus violating his civil rights. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010), we reverse because Holland’s action does not present a de facto appeal of a state court decision..

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district court jurisdiction over an action that (1) “contains a forbidden- de facto appeal of a state court decision” and (2) “seek[s] to litigate an issue that is inextricably intertwined with the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). A de facto appeal exists where (1) “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court” and (2) the plaintiff “seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).

Neither de facto appeal factor is presented here. First, Holland does not allege that a state court committed any legal error. Instead, Holland “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party,” id., namely DCFS’s allegedly unconstitutional investigation of Holland for child abuse, conduct during the juvenile dependency petition against Holland, and actions causing Holland to be listed and to remain on CACI. Second, Holland does not seek relief from a state court judgment. Instead, Holland seeks damages and injunctive and declaratory relief related to his ongoing listing on CACI. In fact, on the record presented, Holland does not appear to have lost in state court. The juvenile dependency proceeding against Holland and his ex-wife was dismissed without prejudice. Defendants contend that Holland suffered an adverse decision in family court, but no family court decision appears in the record. Even if an adverse family court decision were in the record, Holland does not claim that the family court committed any factual or legal error and he does not seek relief from the family court’s judgment. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the district court’s jurisdiction over Holland’s action.

We do not reach the “equitable abstention” and res judicata arguments that Defendants make on appeal because the district court did not rule on them and should be afforded an opportunity to do so in the first instance. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to address a res judicata argument after holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine id not apply); F.D.I.C. v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal and declining to reach other potential grounds for dismissal upon which district court did not rely). 1

*545 The district court’s dismissal of Holland’s case is VACATED and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. ■ The parties shall bear their own costs on ap-’ peal.