MEMORANDUM ***

Plaintiffs Taylor Lee Reynolds and Connie B. Evans appeal the district court’s partial dismissal of their complaint and partial grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Reviewing de novo, Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), petition for cert, filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2015) (No. 14-825), we affirm.

1.Because Plaintiffs failed to raise to the district court their argument concerning the endorsement of the note, the argument is waived. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1063 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2007). In any event, it is unpersuasive. In Nevada, “a promissory note and a deed of trust are automatically transferred together unless the parties agree otherwise.” Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 286 P.3d 249, 257 (Nev. 2012) (en banc). As the district court explained, the deed of trust was transferred validly to the foreclosing entity, GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Because GMAC Mortgage was the beneficiary of the deed and the holder of the note, it had authority to foreclose on the property. Id. at 255. The district court properly granted summary judgment.

2. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, “a mortgage note is a negotiable instrument.” Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev. 2011).

3. We have considered Plaintiffs’ other arguments and find none persuasive.

AFFIRMED.