MEMORANDUM *

To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of speedy trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a court must first determine whether “the interval' between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)).

Once the defendant makes a showing of presumptively prejudicial delay, the court must weigh four factors: (1) “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim,” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686; (2) “the reason the government assigns to justify the delay,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; (3) “[wjhether and how [the] defendant asserts his right ...,” id.; and (4) “prejudice to the defendant,” id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

After concluding that the presumption of prejudice may have been triggered in this case, the district court weighed only two of the Barker factors: the prejudice to the defendant and the length of delay. The district court erred in failing to weigh the *574 other two factors. See id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. It was particularly important in this case that the district court make a finding regarding the government’s reason for the delay. Pulido alleged that the San Jose U.S. Attorney’s Office acted pursuant to a policy of depriving state prisoners of their ability to assert speedy trial rights in § 1326 cases. This allegation, if credited, would weigh heavily in the Barker analysis. See id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.”).

We vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to weigh each of the Barker factors.

VACATED AND REMANDED.