MEMORANDUM ***

Ronald L. Porter appeals pro se from the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in his employment action alleging retaliation and gender dis *631 crimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The record supports the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee”); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) (an award of reasonable attorney’s fees allowable only for “services performed ... after the filing of a written complaint, provided that the attorney provides reasonable notice of representation to the agency ..., except that fees are allowable for a reasonable period of time prior to the notification of representation for any services performed in reaching a determination to represent the complainant”); see also Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991) (pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees). Contrary to Porter’s contentions, the district court reviewed de novo the administrative award of attorney’s fees and costs.

The district court properly denied Porter’s motion to compel discovery because Porter did not require documents from defendant to establish either his costs incurred in the administrative proceedings before he was represented by counsel or his attorney’s fees and costs. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review).

We reject Porter’s contentions that the district court was required to hold a trial, and that he was prejudiced by not receiving notice of the requirements to oppose summary judgment. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (special notice requirements do not apply to non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs).

Porter’s requests for fees and costs on appeal, as set forth in his reply brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED.