MEMORANDUM **

Randel Lane (“Lane”) appeals the district court’s grant of Clark County’s motion for summary judgment under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review de novo a district court’s ruling granting summary judgment. Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lane, the nonmov-ing party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Id.

2. Here, Lane was not a “qualified individual,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), because he could not “perform the essential functions of [his] employment position” “with or without reasonable accommodation.” Id. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Regular presence can be considered an essential function of one’s job. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237-39 (9th Cir. 2012). Lane’s position was one such instance, rather than “the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all work-related duties at home.” Id. at 1239. Because nothing in the record indicates that Lane could be present regularly with or without reasonable accommodation, there was no genuine factual dispute. The district court correctly determined that Lane was not a qualified individual.

AFFIRMED.