MEMORANDUM *

Federal prisoner William S. Poff appeals pro se from the district court’s order striking his “verified notification to recommence litigation of habeas claims.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Poff contends that, because he did not receive notice of the order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the district court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by striking his “notification *397 to recommence” his section 2255 proceedings. He further contends that the lack of notice entitles him to equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal.

Construing Poff s “notification to recommence” as a motion to reopen the time to file an appeal, see United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011), the district court lacked jurisdiction to reopen because the “notification to recommence” was filed more than 180 days after the entry of judgment. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This time limit is jurisdictional and, therefore, not subject to equitable tolling. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). Nor does its application violate Poffs due process rights. See United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West, 602 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.