Philip Bikle v. A. Santos
Philip Bikle v. A. Santos
Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Philip C. Bikle appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action arising out of a traffic citation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Bikle’s action as frivolous because Bikle’s claims lacked any arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a “frivolous” claim lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact; “[the] term ‘frivolous’ ... embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation”); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114, 117-18, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy” in a vehicle’s VIN -number under the Fourth Amendment); of. In re Arturo D., 27 Cal.4th 60, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433, 450-51 (2002) (a police officer’s limited search of the vehicle’s glove compartment and other areas constituted a reasonable search when the plaintiff was unable to produce a driver’s license and registration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Bikle’s action without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,’ 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review).
We do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Bikle’s requests for judicial notice, filed on August 28, 2014, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.