George Vasquez v. Audrey King
George Vasquez v. Audrey King
Opinion
MEMORANDUM ***
George Vasquez, a civil detainee at Coa-linga State Hospital, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with the regulation of his electronic devices. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Vasquez’s equal protection claim because Vasquez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was discriminated against because of his membership in a protected class or that he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals without rational basis. See N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (elements of “class of one” equal protection claim); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (requirements for equal protection claim based on membership in protected class).
However, Vasquez alleged facts in the amended complaint sufficient to state a plausible due process claim arising from the regulation of his electronic devices. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (civilly *435 detained individuals have a substantive due process right to be free from restrictions that amount to punishment); Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the purpose of confinement is not punitive, the state must also provide the civilly-committed with more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly,, we reverse the judgment as-to this claim and remand for further proceedings.
We reject Vasquez’s contentions regarding a right to training.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.