Rizwan Irshad v. Loretta E. Lynch

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Rizwan Irshad v. Loretta E. Lynch, 622 F. App'x 631 (9th Cir. 2015)

Rizwan Irshad v. Loretta E. Lynch

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Rizwan Irshad challenges the BIA’s determination that he was convicted of an *632 aggravated felony, defined in Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as “an offense that ... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (M) (i). Irshad agrees that his offense involved fraud or deceit, but contends'that the BIA erred when it concluded that the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. We review whether a conviction was for an aggravated felony de novo. Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2008).

The monetary threshold established by Section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) “applies to the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s commission of a fraud and deceit crime on a specific occasion.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009). Here, Irshad pleaded guilty to conspiracy under California Penal Code Section 182(a)(1) and agreed that he and his co-defendants were responsible for $22,500 in restitution. This agreement constitutes clear and convincing evidence that the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. See Fuentes v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Nijhawan, 557 U.S. 29, 129 S.Ct. 2294.

Although the BIA erred by relying on overt acts listed in the conspiracy count to which Irshad did not admit, this error was harmless. See Fuentes, 788 F.3d at 1182-83.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publi *632 cation and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

Reference

Full Case Name
Rizwan IRSHAD, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Status
Unpublished