MEMORANDUM **

David J. Dejeu appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion to *902 set aside the judgment dismissing his action alleging claims related to Washington state’s registration requirements for contractors. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. Harman v. Harper, 7 F.3d 1455,1458 (9th Cir. 1993).- We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dejeu’s Rule 60(b) motion because Dejeu failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth grounds for relief from judgment).

To the extent that Dejeu attempts to challenge the district court’s underlying judgment of dismissal, we lack jurisdiction because Dejeu did not timely file a notice of appeal as to the underlying judgment, or a .post-judgment motion that tolled the time to file a notice of appeal as to the judgment. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of judgment); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (time for filing a notice of appeal may be extended where party timely files an enumerated tolling motion); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing óf a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”).

AFFIRMED.