MEMORANDUM ***

No clearly established law addresses whether Hernandez’s counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance by failing to properly advise him about his good-time credits before he pled guilty. The Supreme Court has not determined *542 whether good-time credits are a direct or collateral consequence of a plea, although the California Supreme Court considers them to be collateral. See People v. Barella, 20 Cal.4th 261, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37, 41 (1999). Nor has the Court addressed whether “there may be circumstances under which advice about a matter deemed collateral violates the Sixth Amendment.” Chaidez v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1108, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (holding that the failure to advise a client of deportation consequences of a plea may amount to deficient performance, without deciding whether deportation is a direct or collateral consequence); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (declining to decide whether counsel’s incorrect advice about parole eligibility amounted to ineffective assistance).

Without Supreme Court authority on point, the state court’s determination that Hernandez’s counsel didn’t render ineffective assistance can’t be contrary to or an “unreasonable” application of clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Accordingly, Hernandez isn’t entitled to ha-beas relief.

AFFIRMED.