MEMORANDUM ***

Defendant Kyle Everhart asks this Court to reverse his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The facts of this case are known to the parties, and we do not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

I

Everhart argues that his statements at the FBI office should have been suppressed because they were “tainted” by a Miranda violation supposedly occurring at the hotel, and because he allegedly requested an attorney after his arrest. But Everhart’s statements made in the hotel were spontaneous, not the product of interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478,. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Documentary evidence also definitively establishes that Everhart did not ask for an attorney after being advised of his Miranda rights. And even if Everhart had requested an attorney, he later reiniti-ated conversation with law enforcement by affirmatively requesting an interview. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The statements were rightly admitted.

II

Everhart next claims the physical evidence in the hotel room was illegally obtained. We disagree. Although the exigency of the protective sweep had ended, the officers had a lawful right to be in the room because Everhart’s girlfriend invited them to stay. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186-88, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). As a result, the evidence was validly seized under the plain view doctrine. See Horton v. California, *319 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).

AFFIRMED.