MEMORANDUM ***

Miguel E. Diaz, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Diaz’s action because Diaz failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (setting forth requirements for a deliberate indifference claim); Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The [Americans with Disabilities Act] prohibits discrimination because *369 of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

Because the district court dismissed Diaz’s action for failure to state a claim, we reject Diaz’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his action for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order.

AFFIRMED.