MEMORANDUM *

Jonathan Bloedow appeals the district court’s order dismissing his qui tam action for lack of.subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

The district court did not err in concluding that the False Claims Act’s- (“FCA”) public disclosure bar applied to Bloedow’s suit. 1 The “FCA sets up a two-part test” for subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999). First, we agree with the district court that, taken together, the Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles complaint, No. CV 05-8818, 2008 WL 2841883 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2008), and the 2011 report by the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services “constituted a ‘public disclosure’ of the ‘allegations or transactions’ upon which [Bloedow’s] -FCA suit is based.” Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)), That neither document explicitly references Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest (“PPGN”) is not determinative of the public disclosure bar. See id at 1018-19. Second, we agree that Bloedow does not qualify as an “original source” under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). United States ex rel. Devlin v. California, 84 F.3d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1996). His knowledge of PPGN’s allegedly fraudulent behavior was neither “direct” nor “independent.” Id. at 361.- Thus, the district court *336 lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Bloedow’s case.

AFFIRMED.