MEMORANDUM ***

Federal inmate Lindell Brown appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, which challenges the calculation of his sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo. Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2011).

Brown is not entitled to credit toward his federal sentence for time served in state custody prior to the imposition of his federal sentence. The federal court imposed the sentence on November 14, 2008, to be served concurrently with the previously imposed state sentence, and the Bureau of Prisons designated the state facility for service of the federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) nunc pro tunc to that date. Therefore, the sentence commenced on November 14, 2008 (while Brown was still serving time in a Michigan state prison) and could not be backdated prior to its commencement. See' 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Schleining, 642 F.3d at 1247-48. Moreover, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 1 , because the time Brown spent in custody before his federal sentence was imposed was credited to the state sentence, he is not entitled to any additional credit. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992).

Nor was the Bureau of Prisons required to contact the sentencing judge to calculate credit. The Bureau of Prisons has the exclusive authority to award credit, and it is not bound by the sentencing judge’s recommendation. Id. at 333-34, 112 S.Ct. 1351; United States v. Peters, 470 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

Finally, the record does not support Brown’s claim that the sentencing court adjusted his sentence pursuant to Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.3. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5G1.3 (Nov. 2008). In Brown’s direct appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that Brown was ineligible for an adjustment under § 5G1.3(b), United States v. Brown, 417 Fed.Appx. 488, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2011), and there is no evidence in the record that the sentencing court concluded that Brown’s case was “an extraordinary case” that would warrant a downward departure under § 5G1.3(c). Id. § 5G1.3 cmt. n. 3(E).

AFFIRMED.