MEMORANDUM *

Adranik Petrosian appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habe-as petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Petrosian’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires both deficient performance and prejudice). After the district court questioned its decision to admit Petrosian’s incriminating proffer statements during the government’s casein-chief, counsel made an objectively reasonable strategic decision—in consultation with his client—not to seek a mistrial. See id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under the plain language of the proffer agreement, Petro-sian’s statements would also have been admissible at a new trial, see United States v. Petrosian, 446 Fed.Appx. 826, 828 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he government was allowed to introduce his proffer statements under the agreement due to Petrosian’s lack of candor.”),, and the district court did not rule otherwise. No Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent, moreover, actually-prohibited introduction of the statements during the government’s case-in-chief. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 211, 115 S.Ct. 797, 180 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 406 n.l (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the circuits that had considered the issue had approved case-in-chief waiver provisions. See United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2000). 1 Accordingly, objectively reasonable counsel could have concluded Petrosian’s statements would likely be admitted at a new trial and, therefore, that a new trial would not benefit Petrosian. 2

2. Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, we do not reach the question of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

AFFIRMED.