Robert Strickland v. Ge Capital Retail Bank

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Robert Strickland v. Ge Capital Retail Bank, 670 F. App'x 582 (9th Cir. 2016)

Robert Strickland v. Ge Capital Retail Bank

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Robert Earl Strickland appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Strickland failed *583 to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the release agreement that Strickland signed was invalid. See Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1989) (a release of claims is valid if it is voluntary, deliberate, and informed); see also Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding settlement agreement releasing ADA claims where plaintiff failed to establish that the agreement was procured by duress or any other basis that would render it invalid).

We do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Reference

Full Case Name
Robert Earl STRICKLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GE CAPITAL RETAIL BANK, Defendant-Appellee
Status
Unpublished