dissenting:.

I dissent. This case is another example of the cruelty that besets our immigration laws.

Daniel Ribowo came to the United States in 2000. For over sixteen years, he has worked to build his life here. He married his wife, Idapola, in California in 2002. Together, they have three United States citizen children: Michael (age 13), Maureen (age 10), and Meredith (age 8). These children were born in' the U.S. and have bright futures. The family is active in their Seventh Day Adventist Church: Daniel serves as the Deputy Director of the Pathfinders, where he mentors children at his church; Idapola teaches the bible study class for children under the age of five. They fear returning to Indonesia where *730Christians are a recognized disfavored group. Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). In Indonesia, Christians are “ ‘subject to violence and official discrimination,’ and the [Indonesian] government has largely acquiesced in their persecution by those following ‘militant expressions of Islam.’” Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tampubolon, 601 F.3d at 1060).

Despite the equities in this case, the government has declined to exercise prose-cutorial discretion and has chosen to prosecute Ribowo. In doing so, the government has effectively chosen to prosecute the whole family. Ribowo’s children will either grow up in America without their father or be compelled by circumstances beyond their control to move to a country that they do not know and where they will be in danger because they are Christians. I decline to be a party to such an unkind result.

MEMORANDUM *

Daniel Ribowo, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to reopen his removal proceedings in light of changed country conditions. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

Ribowo’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, in order to prevail on the motion to reopen, Ribowo must “clear four hurdles: (1) he had to produce evidence that conditions *729had changed in [Indonesia]; (2) the evidence had to be material; (3) the evidence must not have been available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding; and (4) he had to demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ribowo failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-88 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Although Ribowo is a member of a disfavored group in Indonesia (Christian Indonesians),1 he failed to present evidence that he would be individually targeted based on his Christian faith. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009). Membership alone in a disfavqred group is not enough. Id. at 1066. The BIA concluded that Ribowo did not produce sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions or individualized risk. The BIA recognized that religious extremism and violence in Indonesia is on-going and that the government has been criticized for failing to prevent it. However, the BIA concluded that current conditions in Indonesia are substantially similar to those that existed at the time of Ribowo’s merits hearing (rather than changed conditions). Ribowo failed to present the quantum of evidence necessary to show that his “predicament [was] appreciably different from the dangers faced by [his] fellow [Indonesians].” Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994)). These conclusions were not an abuse of discretion.2 See Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (noting that the court “defer[s] to the. BIA.’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.