MEMORANDUM **

Lyndon Scheveck appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C, § 1983 action alleging claims arising from his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations. Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Scheveck’s action as time-barred because Scheveck did not submit to the court any document that functioned as a complaint before the applicable statute of limitations had run. See Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Canatella, 486 F.3d at 1132 (the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations applies in § 1983 suits); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."); cf. Hauschulz v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 143 Idaho 462, 147 P.3d 94, 98-99 (2006) (holding that a filing explicitly intended to function as a complaint and submitted to the court clerk’s office is sufficient to initiate action).

We do not consider arguments or allegations raised for the first time on appeal, including Scheveck’s contention regarding equitable estoppel. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.