Raymond Baldwin v. Barbie Doe
Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Raymond Baldwin appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
In his opening brief, Baldwin fails to address the district court’s grounds for dismissal and has therefore waived his .challenge to the district court’s order. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... ”).
We reject as without merit Baldwin’s contention that the district court erred by failing to allow oral argument.
We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid-. ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Raymond BALDWIN, Private Attorney General, PAG; Class, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbie DOE, (Last Name Unknown), Clackamas County Deputy Clerk; Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- Status
- Unpublished