United States v. Joshua Doty
United States v. Joshua Doty
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-10194 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00133-LRH-PAL-1 v. JOSHUA STEPHEN DOTY, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 16, 2018** San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, N.R. SMITH, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Joshua Doty appeals from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), arguing that his previous state court conviction for battery constituting domestic violence under Nevada law does not qualify as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Doty’s entire argument on appeal is premised on the proposition that he was convicted under section 33.018 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, which is in a civil portion of that code. We disagree. Both Nevada statutes and Nevada case law make clear that section 200.485 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, which is in a criminal portion of that code and which is titled “Battery which constitutes domestic violence,” is the statute under which Doty was previously convicted.
See, e.g., English v. State, 9 P.3d 60, 64 (Nev. 2000) (“The definition and penalties for battery constituting domestic violence is [sic] codified at [Nevada Revised Statute §] 200.485 which took effect on January 1, 1998.”).
Doty has waived any argument as to whether section 200.485 is a categorical match to the federal definition of misdemeanor domestic violence contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]ssues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”). We therefore do not reach that issue.
AFFIRMED.
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