NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 19 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-30116 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00148-BLW v. MEMORANDUM* JUSTIN DEAN DIXSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted June 12, 2018** Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Justin Dean Dixson appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 276-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Dixson contends that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence because the court considered improper aggravating factors and deprived him of the benefit of his plea agreement. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Dixson’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and then granted a four-level departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. In deciding to impose a sentence 14 months above the resulting range, the court properly considered several aggravating factors that it believed were not adequately reflected in the Guidelines calculation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 819 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, the district court did not deny Dixson the benefit of his plea agreement. Dixson agreed that the district court could consider all relevant conduct and had complete discretion to impose any lawful sentence, including the statutory maximum of 360 months. The 276-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the duration and extent of the abuse. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

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