Jack Finnegan v. City of Dana Point
Jack Finnegan v. City of Dana Point
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JACK R. FINNEGAN, No. 17-56200 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:17-cv-00976-DSF-DFM v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF DANA POINT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 15, 2018** Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jack R. Finnegan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Finnegan’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Finnegan’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, and he raises issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
AFFIRMED.
2 17-56200
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