United States v. Shavonte Hill

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

United States v. Shavonte Hill

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 26 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-10491

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00132-JAD-NJK-2 v.

SHAVONTE HILL, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 21, 2018** San Francisco, California

Before: CALLAHAN, N.R. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Shavonte Hill appeals the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 26

months in prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). On appeal, Hill challenges only the sufficiency of the indictment against

him. However, he admits that the indictment “allege[d] the three basic elements

required to establish the culpability for being a felon in possession of a firearm.”

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). That concession is fatal, as “[g]enerally, an indictment is

sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the charged offense so as to ensure the

right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy and to be informed of the

offense charged.” United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting United States v. Woodruff, 50 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The concession is also correct. The indictment states that “[o]n or about

January 27, 2017 . . . [Hill] . . . having been convicted of crimes punishable of

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . did knowingly possess . . . a Draco

7.62X39mm pistol with serial number DA 4743-15RO and was manufactured by

ROMARM/CUGIR . . . , said possession being in and affecting interstate

commerce and said firearms having been shipped and transported in interstate

commerce, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and

924(a)(2).” That sets forth all of the elements for convicting Hill of being a felon in

possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1982). Consequently, the indictment is sufficient under our

2 precedent.1 Rodriguez, 360 F.3d at 958.

AFFIRMED.

1 It is irrelevant that Hill “can be seen not to have possessed the firearm,” as the indictment clearly alleged knowing possession. Moreover, Hill did not challenge the sufficiency of the indictment below. Thus, the indictment must be upheld, because “the necessary facts appear . . . [and] by fair construction can be found within the terms of the indictment.” United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)). 3

Reference

Status
Unpublished