John Powers v. Charles Keeton

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

John Powers v. Charles Keeton

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 25 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOHN JAY POWERS, No. 18-15117

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01396-ROS-DMF v.

MEMORANDUM* CHARLES KEETON; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2019** Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

John Jay Powers appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging a procedural due process claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

In his opening brief, Powers fails to address the grounds for summary judgment on his procedural due process claim. Therefore, Powers has waived his challenge to the district court’s disposition of this claim. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Powers’s complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

2 18-15117

Reference

Status
Unpublished