NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-30225 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:17-cr-05531-RBL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* MATTHEW TYLER CHARLES, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 21, 2019** Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Matthew Tyler Charles appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 60-month sentence imposed upon his guilty-plea conviction for domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Charles first contends that the district court erred by denying a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).

We review for clear error a district court’s determination of whether a defendant has accepted responsibility. See United States v. Rodriguez, 851 F.3d 931, 949 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Charles’s conduct, which Charles conceded below warranted an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, was inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (obstructive conduct “ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility”); United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1994) (when defendant receives an obstruction of justice enhancement, an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is available only in the “extraordinary case” when the obstructive conduct is not inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility). Moreover, contrary to Charles’s contention, the district court sufficiently explained its refusal to grant the reduction. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-58 (2007).

Charles also argues that the statutory maximum sentence is substantively unreasonable, given his “horrendous” childhood and his postconviction efforts to educate and rehabilitate himself. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 60-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and

2 18-30225 the totality of the circumstances, including the seriousness of the offense and Charles’s significant criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

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